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Abstract 
NASA implemented a system of technical authority 
following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
(CAE) report calling for independent technical 
authority to be exercised on the Space Shuttle Program 
activities via a virtual organization of personnel 
exercising specific technical authority responsibilities. 
After the current NASA Administrator reported for 
duty, and following the first of two planned "Shuttle 
Return to Flight" missions, the NASA Chief Engineer 
and the Administrator redirected the Independent 
Technical Authority to a program of Technical 
Excellence and Technical Authority exercised within 
the existing engineering organizations. This paper 
discusses the original implementation of technical 
authority and the transition to the new implementation 
of technical excellence, including specific measures 
aimed at improving safety of future Shuttle and space 
exploration flights. 
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Objective 
This paper discusses the direction the CAUB report 
gave to NASA regarding improving safe and reliable 
operations through a system of technical authority, 
NASA's original implementation of technical authority 
and the transition to implementation of technical 
excellence to replace the independent Technical 
Authority. Conclusions and recommendations are not 
offered in this case study since the paper provides 
details and status of the new implementation. The 
status as of the writing of this paper is that both the 
independent Technical Authority and the new 
Technical Excellence are both extant in NASA during 
a transition period, and plans are subject to change. 
Background for Technical Authority 
NASA's Space Shuttle program has conducted 114 
missions, two of which ended in catastrophic failure 
with the loss of 14 astronauts and the Shuttles 
Challenger and Columbia. The two accident 
investigations readily determined the specific hardware 
failures responsible for each accident. Both 
investigations (the Rogers Commission for Challenger 
and Columbia Accident Investigation Board also 
identified organization and management shortcomings 
that contributed to the accidents. The CAB 
determined that organizational and management issues 
Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the CAZB observed 
similarities between the organizational and 
management climate that preceded the Challenger 
accident and the climate that preceded the Columbia 
accident (Keissling, et al). 
NASA program and project managers have the 
ultimate responsibility for safety. The NASA Safety 
and Mission Assurance Offices (SMA) at the various 
NASA field centers assist the project managers with 
their safety responsibility. The CAE3 found a lack of 
rigor imposed on project activities regarding 
responsibility for technical authority and lack of 
influence of the SMA offices on key technical 
decisions. 
The CAIB concluded that NASA's safety 
organization was not an effective voice in discussing 
STS-107 (the fmal Columbia mission) issues due to a 
lack of capability independent of the Shuttle program 
(Gehman et al., 2003). The CAE3 also observed that 
NASA managers at many levels are placed in positions 
without completing a standard training and education 
program to prepare them for their roles (Gehman et al., 
2003). Program and project managers, although 
ultimately responsible for the safety of their programs 
and projects, are not required to complete system safety 
training, for example (Keissling). 
NASA defined technical authority for safe and 
reliable operations and implemented a management 
and organizational scheme to,implement that authority. 
The strategy was aimed at eliminating adverse 
organizational and management climates in the 
technical activities. Under the direction of the newly 
named NASA Administrator, after one year, NASA 
changed the paradigm of implementation of the 
independent Technical Authority (iTA) (The lower 
case '7'' in iTA is used in the acronym since 
independent is an adjective that means the technical 
authority is within NASA but independent of the 
progrdproject organization and funding) by utilizing 
the existing organizational structures with the technical 
authorities imbedded therein rather than via a virtual 
organization as was the iTA. In addition, NASA 
dropped the term "iTA' in favor of Technical 
Excellence and Technical Authority. 
NASA Independent Technical Authority for Safe 
and Reliable Operations 
NASA originally established the technical authority 
and provided these definitions in the first policy 
document regarding the independent Technical 
Authority: 
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1) “Technical Authority - Technical Authority is 
the authority, responsibility, and accountability to 
establish, approve, and maintain technical 
requirements, processes and policy. 
2) Independent Technical Authority - 
Independent Technical Authority is the execution of 
Technical Authority in support of mission-related 
programs and projects without organizational or 
financial control by such programs and/or projects 
(NASA NPD 1240.4).” 
The policy document included the following major 
1) 
policy statements: 
requirements and processes is delegated from the 
Administrator to the NASA Chief Engineer. 
2) A system of Technical Warrants will be used 
to further delegate Independent Technical Authority. 
The technical warrant holders are to be proven subject 
matter experts with mature judgment. 
Individuals delegated Independent Technical 
Authority shall: 1) be funded independently from 
Program and Project funding, (b) not report to a 
Program or Project Manager, and, (c) hold authority for 
technical matters under their warranted cognizance 
separate from any program management structure 
(NASA NPD 1240.4).” 
The NASA Administrator delegated the Chief 
Engineer as the Agency’s Technical Authority. The 
independent Technical Authority (iTA) was set up not 
as an organization but as an authority and 
responsibility vested in individuals called Warrant 
Holders. A warrant holder is not a position; it is a 
person to whom the NASA Chief Engineer delegated 
the authority and responsibility for safe and reliable 
operations within the scope and bounds of the 
particular warrant. Warrant holders were given 
authority for establishing technical requirements and 
overseeing the implementation of technical 
requirements in NASA systems. 
and disciplines. Every major NASA system, for 
example the Shuttle Program had System Warrant 
Holders for Orbiter, Propulsion Systems, and Ground 
Operations, while a fourth System Warrant holder was 
named for the International Space Station. Discipline 
Warrant holders were also named in many engineering 
disciplines across NASA. 
While the iTA was applied to all NASA programs 
that have human safety considerations, the iTA did not 
replace the functions and responsibilities of the various 
safety organizations across the Agency. The iTA is a 
“The Technical Authority for technical 
The Warrant Holders were established for systems 
“first look” at human safety that is imbedded in 
engineering activities and the safety organizations, in a 
sense, are a “second and independent” look at safety 
compliance. Tailoring of the specific iTA 
implementation was done depending on the size and 
type of flight program. Funding was from a general 
Headquarters pool. 
The authority of a technical warrant holder was 
equal to the authority of program and project managers 
only on issues of human safety. Program and project 
managers still exercised their authority to execute their 
programs/projects, and balance schedule and costs, but 
any disagreements between the iTA and program 
management about safe and reliable operations could 
be raised to NASA Headquarters management level for 
resolution. 
To carry out the distinct iTA activities as planned, 
the NASA policy also stated responsibilities of various 
functions (NASA NPD 1240.4): 
“Center Directors are responsible for 
implementing the NASA Chief Engineer’s Technical 
Authority policies and processes in engineering 
activities at their Center. 
are responsible for ensuring the implementation of 
technical authority policies, procedures, and 
responsibilities by programs and projects as well as 
providing the resources for the Agency Service Pool 
for the execution of Technical Authority. 
for incorporating technical authority processes and 
procedures in their programs and projects and 
following the requirements established by the 
Technical Authorities in the conduct of technical 
decision-making in order to ensure safe and reliable 
operations and missions. 
Officer is responsible for assuring compliance with 
technical requirements established by Agency 
Technical Authorities. 
executing their authority diligently and dispassionately, 
and with primary attention to quality, completeness, 
applicability, timeliness, and clarity of technical work. 
6 )  The Chief Engineer establishes budgets for 
Independent Technical Authority using an Agency 
Service Pool concept that provides for the execution 
independent of direct progrdproject and 
flighthission funding. 
approves funds for the execution of Independent 
Technical Authority and the Comptroller provides the 
mechanisms for the execution of an Agency Service 
Pool by Technical Authorities independent of direct 
program and project funding.” 
1) 
2) Mission Directorate Associate Administrators 
3) Program and Project Managers are responsible 
4) The Chief Safety and Mission Assurance 
5)  Technical Authorities are responsible for 
7) The Operations Management Council 
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Another NASA document, NASA Procedural 
Requirement NPR 1240.1, ‘WASA Technical Warrant 
Systems,” describes the technical warrant holders 
(TWHs) process: 
total systems level will be systems technical experts 
who have the authority, responsibility, and 
accountability to establish, monitor and approve all 
technical standards and requirements, processes, 
products, policies, and variances for their assigned 
systems. At the systems level, TWHs provide the 
checks and balances on the execution of technical work 
conducted in support of mission-related programs and 
projects. These Systems TWHs (STWHs) will utilize 
discipline TWHs and their network of experts as 
required and appropriate. 
the specific disciplines will be subject matter experts in 
particular technical disciplines who have the authority, 
responsibility and accountability to establish, approve, 
and maintain technical standards and requirements, 
processes, products, policies and variances for their 
assigned technical area across the Agency. These 
Discipline TWHs (DTWHs) are recognized throughout 
NASA as experts in their technical field and, along 
with their network of trusted agents, will be utilized by 
STWHs.” 
NASA NPR 1240.1 also delineated the 
responsibilities of the TWH. “TWHs are subject 
matter experts in their systems or their technical 
disciplines. Within the areas defined by the warrant; 
TWHs shall: 
a. Provide leadership and are accountable for all 
technical standards and requirements; 
b. Establish and maintain technical policy, 
technical standards, requirements and processes; 
c. Exercise integrity and discipline in providing 
sound technical judgments; 
d. Ensure technical products are in conformance 
with technical policy, standards and requirements. 
Where they are not, identify and approve any non- 
conformance via an engineering variance (i.e. change, 
waiver or deviation); 
e. Ensure risk, failure and hazard analysis are 
conducted and the results are incorporated into 
technical products and requirements; 
determine which are technically acceptable, and 
perform associated risk and value assessments; 
g. Provide activities conducting verification, 
validation and certification functions (e.g. FRR, 
Assurance, etc.) their positions on the technical 
requirements in their areas; 
1) “Systems Technical Warrants - TWHs at the 
2) Discipline Technical Warrants - TWHs for 
f. Identify and evaluate technical alternatives, 
h. Support Program and Project Managers by 
providing the engineering, technical standards and 
technical products, and decisions necessary to ensure 
safe and reliable operations; 
concepts meet defined technical standards and 
requirements; 
and personal credibility through professional 
development, certifications, and new technology 
awareness; 
k. Develop personnel certification requirements 
and succession planning; 
1. Maintain technical infrastructure in order to 
effectively perform their duties; 
m. Establish a subordinate network of center 
discipline leads, technical leads, engineering agents, 
technicallengineering managers, etc. as necessary to 
fulfill their responsibilities across the Agency (with 
accountability remaining with the TWH). The 
supporting network will be comprised of individuals 
having the requisite technical expertise, organizational 
independence as necessary, experience, and maturity to 
perform the work that TWHs need to execute their 
warrant appropriately; 
n. Interface with other TWHs promoting 
communications throughout the Agency technical 
community to ensure appropriate individuals and 
organizations are aware of and involved in technical 
issues; 
Resources and Education communities of NASA; 
incorporated into technical documents and made 
available to others; 
q. When performing their warranted function, 
TWHs will charge to an Agency Service Pool as will 
their network of engineering agents, engineering 
managers, and others when they are performing 
technical work for the TWH in the execution of the 
warrant functions; and 
r. Identify future resources needed to properly execute 
their responsibilities.” 
Actual implementation involved deep penetration 
by the Warrant Holders into the technical issues and 
decisions of the major NASA space flight systems. All 
TWHs identified “trusted agents” around the Agency to 
assist them in collecting and analyzing data relative to 
these technical issues. In addition, the STWHs used 
the DTWHs and their network of trusted agents as a 
tool. A NASA Engineering and Safety Center was also 
i. Assure technical principles, capabilities, and 
j. Maintain technical area expertise, competency, 
0. Interface with the Science, Technology, Human 
p. Ensure lessons learned are captured, evaluated, 
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set up to provide ready access to Agency technical 
experts in a variety of disciplines to resolve technical 
issues of an important or urgent nature in a short time. 
mportance of an Independent Safety 
The CAE3 report recommended an independent safety 
organization and highlighted that an independent safety 
organization must have the ability and authority to 
speak openly and with effect, and must have sufficient 
technical resources to effectively penetrate issues and 
provide credible positions with solid supporting 
rationale and evidence. An independent safety 
organization must have sufficient stature in the 
organization to be able to promptly communicate 
issues and concerns to the relevant decision authority 
in order to assure the proper focus on safety. To be 
truly independent, an independent safety organization 
should be funded by a neutral element of the 
organization structure rather than by the supported 
program or project office. The CAD3 also reported that 
the Space Shuttle “operational and system safety 
program is flawed by its dependence on the Shuttle 
program.. . the safety apparatus is not currently capable 
of fulflling its mission.. . An independent safety 
structure would provide the Shuttle program a more 
effective operational safety process (Gehman et al., 
2003).” 
For example the Safety and Mission Assurance 
(SMA) Offices were funded by the supported programs 
and projects. Consequently, SMA could be limited by 
the amount of resources a given program or project was 
willing to fund and hence in the amount of service 
provided to that program or project. The CAIB also 
observed that NASA “could not obtain budget 
increases during the 1990s” and did not “adjust its 
ambitions to this new state of affairs (Gehman et al., 
2003).” The C A B  noted that SMA organizations had 
not received adequate funding in recent years. 
Furthermore, there is a natural human tendency to 
agree with the judgments of one’s benefactor. Thus, 
SMA employees so funded may be predisposed to be 
more understanding and less critical of the programs 
and projects supported (Keissling, et al). As stated 
above, an initial move was made to alleviate the 
perceived influence of direct funding on the SMA 
organizations. 
safety organization, the independent Technical 
Authority, implemented as a virtual organization, and 
the creation of the NASA Engineering and Safety 
Center, combined to establish what NASA hoped 
would be a strong technical entity that would improve 
safe and reliable operations. 
Parallel with that move toward a more independent 
NASA Technical Authority 
After some initial consideration of how NASA should 
function strategically and in a sense of governance, the 
newly appointed NASA Administrator clearly 
described how the Technical Authority is to be 
implemented in NASA in an early 2006 email to a 
broad audience of NASA executives: “The Program 
Manager (I’M) has the Authority, Responsibility, and 
Accountability (AR&A) to manage the program risks 
so that the program meets all funding, technical and 
schedule requirements. Funding requirements are set 
by law for government programs, or by 
stockholders/owners in the private sector. Technical 
requirements for the safe operations of the program are 
set by a technical authority not under program 
direction. Schedule requirements are set by a variety of 
outside factors not under the PM’s control (e.g., statute, 
treaty, contract, etc.). The organizational Comptroller 
and IG assure funding compliance. SMA assures 
compliance with the established critical technical 
requirements. Schedule compliance is assured by third 
parties depending on the source of the schedule 
requirement. That is why the Comptroller, IG, 
Technical Authority and SMA are not in the PM’s 
chain of command. 
critical performance requirements, critical technical 
requirements for safe operations, or the schedule 
requirements. The PM has the AR&A to comply with 
those requirements. The PM’s discretionary decisions 
within those constraints require controlling 
expenditures, mission content, and/or schedule as 
necessary to comply with requirements for safe 
operations, funding limits, and mandatory schedule 
dates. 
for safe operations is set independently by the 
designated engineers, in a separate line of AR&A, 
ultimately responsible to the same position @e., NASA 
Administrator) as is the PM. At NASA, this is done 
through the Center Directors, in the institutional chain 
of command. The independent SMA group assures 
compliance with the safe operations requirements 
controlled by the Technical Authority. At NASA, as 
prerequisites to flight, the Technical Authority certifies 
that the established requirements will support safe 
operations. The PM certifies that the requirements for 
safe flight have been met. SMA certifies that the PM 
has complied with the requirements. These three 
independent inputs give the Administrator the 
confidence that everyone has properly exercised 
AR&A (Griffin, 2006a).” 
additional clarification a few weeks later lest anyone 
not be sure on his intent: 
“. . . In particular, it seems that there continues to 
be some confusion over ‘ownership’ of requirements, 
The PM may not change the funding requirements, 
The technical authority for requirements necessary 
The Administrator, in another email, provided 
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with some institutional folks believing they own “all 
requirements”, including programmatic requirements 
such as the SRD and CARD, and not just the 
engineering standards and policy documents and 
OSMA requirements. 
place in NASA where both institutional and 
programmatic requirements come together is in the A- 
Suite; they are otherwise separate (Griffin, 2006b).” 
The Administrator went on to say that the 
institutional chain of command has nothing whatever to 
say about mission performance requirements at the 
Program Office level - those being settled between and 
among Mission Director Associate Administrators and 
the Office of the Administrator. Institutional 
management can an should make their case to Mission 
Directors and Program Managers when they believe 
that performance/technical trades and decisions are 
being done wrong, and the Mission Directors and 
Program Managers should listen. The final call is that 
of the Mission Directors and Program Managers unless 
overruled by the Administrator’s Office. The 
Administrator further states that such an overrule 
should and would be “a big deal” and that the 
institutional managers have a voice at the Strategic 
Management Council and Program Management 
Council, not in the program office (Griffin, 2006b). 
This clarification is to make certain that NASA 
managers understand the separate responsibilities of 
the program and project management and technical 
management organizations when it comes to 
requirements. The message also makes it clear that the 
level of joint programmatic and technical responsibility 
and authority comes at the NASA Headquarters level 
(the A-suite is a name for the Administrator’s Office). 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The only 
The Technical Excellence Process 
In general, NASA is transitioning from the warrant 
holder method of providing technical authority to a 
process that uses the existing technical organization 
structure to implement the authority. Within the 
existing engineering directorates, for example, the 
chain of command now implements the technical 
authority, along with the Chief Engineers who are 
identified specifically for each project. This 
implementation puts the technical authority in the 
hands of the technical experts performing the work for 
projects in addition to the chief engineers, who are 
usually well-seasoned technical persons with a broad 
background of technical competence. The 
requirements ownership resides w i t h  the 
organizations responsible for the technical discipline 
and not with a single individual. NASA Centers are 
now engaged in developing implementation plans to 
delineate specifically how each Center plans to 
implement the Technical Excellence within their 
existing structures. 
for system safety, reliability and maintainability, 
quality, software assurance, and risk management and 
work in a matrix fashion to the programs and projects, 
developing their technical products while working 
closely with engineering. As with engineering 
technical authority, SMA technical authority maintains 
and establishes the system safety, reliability and 
maintainability, quality, software assurance and risk 
management requirements for meeting mission 
performance requirements. SMA grants waivers and 
deviations to these requirements and elevates safety 
and mission success disputes through the appropriate 
Center Director and NASA Chief SMA Officer. 
the current lack of broader technical expertise, there 
needs to be a strong focus on technical excellence 
across the Agency. NASA chose to implement a 
Technical Fellows Program to identify discipline 
leaders across the Agency who can serve as shepherds 
of the disciplines. These high-ranking technical 
positions will be compensated on an equivalent basis 
with the executive managers of the Agency. By 
implementing a Technical Fellows Program, NASA is 
selecting the technical leaders in the Agency who will 
set the example for technical excellence, increase the 
focus on technical excellence Agency-wide, recognize 
outstanding engineers and scientists who have 
distinguished and sustained records of technical 
achievement, and provide role models for NASA 
engineering and science communities. 
NASA, therefore, is moving from the Technical 
Warrant concept to that Technical 
Excellence/Technical Authority (TE/TA) concept. The 
general tenets (subject to change at the time of this 
writing) of the Technical Excellence concept are: 
Center SMA organizations have technical authority 
To achieve the goals of the Agency, and to correct 
e No Discipline Technical Warrant 
Holders (DTWHs) 
e 
(STWHs) 
No System Technical Warrant Holders 
e Center implementation plans identify specific 
e A Technical Fellows (TF) program is part of the 
implementation for their organizations 
concept 
o 
o 
Tiered = Senior TF, TF, Associate 
Senior Fellows = technical discipline 
TF 
experts with Agency responsibilities paid at 
ST level 
Some of these responsibilities are 
now done by Discipline Technical Warrant 
Holders (DTWHs) 
Technical Fellows disciplines identified so far 
o 
e 
include: 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Aerodynamics 
Avionics I Electronics 
Electrical 
Flight Mechanics 
Human Factors 
Loads and Dynamics 
Materials - Polymer based 
Non-Destructive Evaluation 
Propulsion 
Software 
Statistical Sciences 
Systems Engineering 
Aerothermal 
CommunicationsITracking 
Electrical Power 
Guidance, Navigation & Control 
Life SupportIActive Thermal 
Materials - MetalslCeramics 
Mechanical 
Passive Thermal 
Robotic Operations 
Space Environment 
Structures 
Systems Safety Engineering (SSE) 
Recent additional consideration has been 
placed on Technical Fellows for the Reliability, 
Maintainability, Quality, and Risk Management 
disciplines. 
Technical Fellows are envisioned to exercise 
several specific responsibilities, as shown in this list 
(compiled from a variety of presentations on the 
subject by several people): 
the Office of the Chief Engineer with regard to 
improving the discipline and the NASA Engineering 
and Safety Center (NESC) 
Serve as an independent resource to the 
agency and industry 
Foster consistency with creation and 
maintenance of agency level standards and 
specifications - using center discipline leads and others 
* 
enhance discipline awareness (e.g., SSE Awareness 
Training) 
0 
* 
0 Prerequisites: 
o ’ Must be a hll-time, permanent 
NASA employee with a minimum grade of 
GS-15 or equivalent for at least one year 
o Must have earned an advanced 
degree in science or engineering 
o Must have demonstrated sustained 
technical leadership 
* Serve as senior technical expert in support of 
0 
0 
Conduct workshops and conferences to 
Identify and address critical discipline issues 
Do not exercise Technical Authority 
o 
o 
Must have published technical papers 
Must have received recognition for 
andor engineering reports 
technical achievements 
Summary 
The implementation of the new Technical Excellence 
approach in NASA offers a unique opportunity for the 
technical organizations to step up to a critical 
responsibility for assuring the technical readiness of 
NASA’s space flight hardware and software. The 
technical organizations will be responsible for safe and 
reliable operations, as they have always been, by 
properly implementing their discipline requirements, 
methods and techniques with no ambiguity of technical 
responsibility. Improving on the technical capabilities 
of the engineers within the Agency is a necessary part 
of that process. Implementing technical authority 
within the technical organizational structure and clearly 
communicating that process along with providing 
technical experts to shepherd the disciplines is truly a 
concept whose time has come. 
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